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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to identify the determinants and consequences of interlocking board 
membership in New Zealand and whether this interlocking affects the firm performance. This research 
used a sample of 276 firm years and 1,783 directors from New Zealand listed companies. A two-fold 
approach analysing the overlap of directors’ names, boards, and company levels was used. 
This research finds that New Zealand firms are highly interlocked. While concentrated ownership firms 
react negatively to interlocking, this research finds that interlocking is negatively impacting firm 
performance in New Zealand. This research also finds that New Zealand firms were significantly 
interlocked under both approaches, which resulted in negative firm performance. 
This study has wide application to the New Zealand Financial Market Authority and Institute of Directors 
New Zealand to evidence the possible effects of directors of being involved (“busy”) in more than one 
company at the same time. 
This is the first paper on firm and board interlocking based on New Zealand stock exchange data 
following the corporate governance best practice code 2004 regime which identified both the 
determinants and consequences of interlocking.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this research is to identify the determinants of firms having interlocking directors in 
their boards. We also examine the consequences of interlocking board relationships in whether 
interlocking affects firm performance. Interlocking occurs when a director sits on his or her own 
company board but also on at least one other board. Empirical research suggests that firms with a 
higher level of interlocked board members can gather diversified expertise and experience which 
helps firms to improve the managerial decision making process and causes higher firm 
performance. Alternatively, interlocks have become the primary indicator of inter-firm network 
ties which helps to identify them in publicly available information from highly reliable sources 
(Devos, Prevost & Puthenpurackal, 2009). Presence of interlocking board members and 
connected boards may compromise the effectiveness of board monitoring with respect to the 
setting of directorial and CEO compensation. Therefore, interlocking board members may create 
an alternative “power house” within the network to deprive shareholders of some influence. 
However, the behaviour of interlocking directorship is unknown when the firm is strictly in an 
ownership controlled environment. Any impact of interlock on the information asymmetry 
environment is yet to be investigated.  
The corporate centrality in New Zealand is relatively new following the economic shift 
towards capitalism in late 1980. A lower level of corporate centrality extant in the early 1970’s 
became more interlocked to capture business and political power following the economic shift 
(Murray, 2006). A recent survey by Parker (2012) indicates that 15 percent of directors serve 
more than one board and out of the interlocking directors, 25 percent of female directors’ served 
on more than one board. Recently, the Financial Market Authority New Zealand (2013) issued a 
best practice guide for directors and emphasized the importance of ‘dedicated time’ from 
directors to the directorial role. The report argues that directors can only add value if they spend 
the time which the company requires in order to professionally carry out their duties. 
Extant literature on the effect of interlocking directorship is not conclusive.  Following 
the ‘reputation’ hypothesis, directors holding multiple board appointments have the advantage of 
allowing them to learn about different management styles and to enhance their skills. 
Alternatively, the ‘busyness’ hypothesis predicts that interlocking board member will devote less 
attention to each of the boards and/or to prefer one board to another in terms of time use and, 
ultimately, cause lower performance in the second company. In a recent stream of interlocking 
literature Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2008) find that firms with more interlocked 
directors on the board exercise greater accounting discretion, potentially contributing to excess 
CEO compensation. Contradictory findings in different countries enhance further research on 
board interlocking and performance. 
The managerial labour market in New Zealand, while different from other countries, is 
criticised due to the lack of qualified independent directors (Goldfinch, 2004). Relaxed 
monitoring and less pressure on independent directors (Farrar, 2005) along with the shortage of 
company directors (Bhuiyan & Habib, 2011) creates a unique environment in New Zealand for 
corporate governance research and directors’ ‘busyness’ related to interlocking board members. 
Using a sample of New Zealand listed companies from 1999 – 2011, this research aims to 
examine the determinants of board interlocking in New Zealand. This research will also extend 
the work of Bhuiyan and Habib (2011) to see the effect of interlocking directorship on firm 
performance in New Zealand. A significant contribution of this research is related to higher 
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ownership concentration in New Zealand, relative to most developed capital markets (United 
States, UK and Australia). The New Zealand business environment is comparatively close 
enough for familiarity to arise between people in the same (or similar) professions and therefore 
the possibility of professional networking is higher than in the USA and UK. Moreover, high 
ownership concentration created information asymmetry and agency problems (Hossain et al., 
2001) in the New Zealand context. This research also aims to split ownership between 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership and individual ownership 
and to examine how different ownership interacts with multiple directorships. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides relevant literature and the 
conceptual arguments of board interlocking. Section three explains research methods and data 
research design. Section four presents the result discussion while section five concludes the 
paper with remarks and comments on future research. 
2. Literature Review 
Outside directorship serves as an important incentive for directors to enhance their reputation as 
monitoring specialists (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Following this, Mace (1986) argues that outside 
directorships are perceived to be valuable because they provide executives with prestige, 
visibility and commercial contacts. Early research indicates that busy directors are beneficial for 
the business as they have more diversified expertise and experience. Biggins (1999) posits that 
diverse boards help to better represent all shareholders, nurture better appreciation of 
‘intangibles’ such as work/life balance issues and can help recruit and retain top executive 
women and minorities”. Singh, Vinnicombe, and Johnson, (2000) argue that lack of diversity in 
boards can be associated with negative performance, especially where boards are highly 
interconnected (e.g. through interlocking directorships), while Mattis (2000) contends that lack 
of diversity on a board can contribute to a dearth of critical thinking and innovation. 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) interlocking directorship research follows two different 
hypotheses. Firstly, the interlock may indicate the director’s quality. Directors having multiple 
seats on different organisations’ boards’ signals wider acceptance of his/her expertise and 
sincerity in their profession. If this is true, then multiple directorships will enhance active 
monitoring and reduce agency costs. Therefore it would result in enhancing shareholders’ 
confidence and lead to higher stock price. Secondly, and in contrast, directors with too many 
outside board seats may be so busy that they do not function as effective monitors. The 
diminishing oversight may cause more severe agency costs as managers serve to further their 
private benefits at the expense of shareholders and may cause an inverse relation between higher 
outside directorships and market return. Existing research has been scant in examining the effect 
of concentrated ownership, managerial discretion and market price. This research aims to 
enhance the knowledge about multiple directorships within the New Zealand context of 
ownership structure.  
New Zealand has a unique business environment with concentrated ownership which 
may cause mechanisms of corporate governance to be ineffective. The concentrated ownership 
also creates a possible environment of interlocking relationship among the firms. Silva, Majluf 
and Paredes (2006) suggest that firms’ performance may be affected by their ownership – control 
structure and the “social ties” of the firm. They categorised a social tie as family ties and 
interlocking directorship. Mizruchi (1996) reports that the interlocking of directors facilitates the 
transfer of information, brings high cohesion and diminishes the probability of opportunistic 
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behaviour. In contrast, the effect of social ties is negative if family relationship and the 
interlocking of directors are used to extract value from the firm at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
Existing research evidence that interlocking is decreasing in different geographical 
location. Roy, Fox and Hamilton (1994) examined the changes in interlocking directorates for all 
listed companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in the year 1987, 1990 and 1993. Their 
results showed a decrease in the number of potential director interlocks from 5.6 in 1987 to 3.3 
in 1993. Using a sample of 2001–2003; Devos et al. (2009) found that interlocks declined from 
71 in 2001 to 29 in 2003 and evidence that interlock does not significantly reduce a firms’ value. 
Existing literature emphasizes that independent directors are good monitors but 
increasing independence may not result in improved monitoring in all circumstances.  
Interlocking directors reflect a subset of independent directors and they represent a large 
percentage of total independent directors (Keys & Li, 2005). These directors served on multiple 
boards and are categorised as ‘career oriented directors’. Interlocking board members are always 
open to the concern that they might “shrink” their duties in response to the time demands of their 
many directorships. Alternatively, the risk of shrinking behaviour may be overcome by the 
benefit of experience that such directors can bring to a board (Hunton & Rose, 2008). 
Extant research studies have evidenced that poorly performing firms are more likely to 
interlock directors on their board and that the market reacts negatively to the announcement of 
directors appointment that creates interlock boards (Devos et al., 2009). Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) show that firms in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more board seats 
have significantly lower market-to-book ratios than firms in which a majority of outside directors 
hold fewer than three board seats; the magnitude of this effect is economically meaningful too.  
Beasley (1996) reports that the probability of committing accounting fraud is positively 
related to the average number of directorships held by outside directors. Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim 
(2010) examine the impact of multiple directorships on stockholders’ wealth around the 
announcement of merger and acquisitions and argue that multiple directorships affect the quality 
of managerial oversight and thus influence agency conflicts in an acquisition decision. They 
found that multiple outside board seats induce negative announcement returns only when the 
number of multiple directorships reaches a higher threshold. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
(1999) report that busy directors set excessively high levels of CEO compensation, which in turn 
leads to poor firm performance. In contrast, Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find no 
relationship between the average number of directorships held by outside directors and the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio. This research will elaborate on the existing literature to evidence the effect 
of board interlocking on managerial discretion and how shareholders are responding to board 
interlocking firms. 
3. Research Method and Data 
This section presents the measurement of board interlocking and firms’ performance approaches 
that are used in this research. The following explanation describes data collection and regression 
models which were administered to examine as determinants of interlocking and performance 
effects.  
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a) Measurement of board interlocking 
The primary variable of interest for measurement of board interlocking is considered as 
the interlocking directorship exists if: 
• A board of director is involved in outside board as board interlocking; or 
• Companies involving each other through the directors as company-to-company 
interlocking 
Board interlocking indicates ‘X’ numbers of directors are sitting in ‘Y’ number of other 
firm boards. Therefore, ‘Y’ number is considering the board interlocking. Company to company 
interlocking indicates ‘company Z’ has interlocking (through the board member) with ‘Q’ 
number of companies. The total number counts to measure the interlocking for both board and 
companies. 
b) Measurement of firm performance 
Firm performance is measured using three proxies. First, return on assets, ratio of net 
income before tax and total assets. Second, return on sales, a ratio of net sales and total assets. 
Third, loss dummy, a dichotomous variable valued 1 if the firm has a negative profit during the 
financial year and 0 otherwise.  
c) Data 
Data related to firms and directors obtained primarily from the NZX deep archive for 
1999-2011 proxy sessions in every alternative year (such as, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2011). 
This study considers every alternate year to identify the interlocking variance assuming that 
interlocking position does not fluctuated much every year. The sample covers 276 firm years and 
includes a total of 1,783 board of directors’ information. Foreign and subsidiary firms are 
excluded from the sample to obtain consistency and to reflect the purely New Zealand business 
environment.  Financial institutes such as bank and insurance companies are also excluded as 
corporate governance structure and compliance for these firms are comparatively different than 
manufacturing and non-finance industry. Financial data such as sales, net income, total assets are 
collected from DATASTREAM. 
 
d) Empirical research method 
In order to investigate determinates of interlocking and performance effects, two 
regression models are administered to explore the statistical relationship. Firstly, determinants of 
board interlocking in equations (1) and (2) are considered that are labelled as interlocking 
determinates equations. Secondly, firm performance relationship with board interlocking 
investigated in equations (3) to (8) that are called interlocking effect equations.  
 
1.  Interlocking determinants equations  
The first two regression models examine the determinants of board interlocking in New 
Zealand. The study models are as follows:    
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 =  𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 +
𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝜕6log (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7log (𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + ε … … …    (1) 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 +
𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + ε … … …    (2) 
 
2. Interlocking effects equations  
The remaining equations (3–8) indicate the regression models for effects of board 
interlocking on firm performance. In equations 3 to 8, firms’ performance consider as a proxy for 
return on assets, return on sales and loss dummy of financial performance.   
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 +
𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝜕6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + ε … … …   (3) 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 +
𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝜕6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + ε … … …   (4) 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑 = 𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝜕6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + ε  
(5) 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 +
𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 + ε … … …  (6) 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 +
𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 + ε … … …  (7) 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 + ε … … …  (8) 
Where; 
Interlock board of director = total number of interlocking in the board with other firms board 
(board interlocking) 
Interlock company to company = total number of interlocking in the board with other firms 
(company to company interlocking)  
ROA = a proxy of firm performance, ratio of net income and total assets; 
ROS = a proxy of firm performance, ratio of total sales and total assets; 
LOSS_DUMMY = a proxy of firm performance, value of 1 if negative profit during 
the financial year, otherwise 0. 
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Log (BODSIZE) = natural log of total number of directors in the board; 
%BODIND = percentage of total number of independent board members; 
CEO interlock = a dichotomous variable of CEO interlock measure. A value of ‘1’ 
is assigned if CEO is an interlocking member and ‘0’ otherwise; 
CODE = a dichotomous variable of 1 if observation is pre-corporate 
governance code, 0 otherwise; 
TOP20_SHROWN  = total percentage of share hold by the top twenty shareholder; 
Log (SALES) = log value of sales, a proxy of firm operating complexity; 
Log (TA) = natural log of total assets as a proxy of firm size. 
Table 1: Sample distribution 
Sample distribution Yearly distribution 
Details Number Industry no. of sample 
Total listed companies in NZX till to date 2012 149 Agriculture 7 
Companies doesn't cover full research period  45 Construction 7 
Companies listed in foreign stock exchange 13 Consumer 28 
Financial companies 19 Energy  28 
Interlocking director information is not available 31 Forestry 7 
    Intermediate & durables 28 
    Leisure 28 
  
 
Media 14 
    Mining 21 
    Property 14 
    Service 42 
    Textile 10 
    Transport 42 
Total companies covered in the sample 41 Total 276 
 
4. Results 
Panel A of Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of the variable used in the regression 
analyses. Average board interlocking in New Zealand is approximately 5 companies in number, 
while the board size median is 6 person (mean is 6.5 person). About 6 of the directors are 
independent on the board and CEO interlocks are detected in almost 33 percent of observations 
firm. About 14 percent companies are experiencing loss during the observation period. About 29 
companies are interlocking each other with the interlocking directors in New Zealand. 43 percent 
of the companies are in pre-code period of observation with an average of 80.74 percent 
shareholding concentration.
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Table 2 - Panel A: Descriptive Analysis 
Variables Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25 50 75 
BODINTERLOCK No. BOD. BUS 5.255 5.000 6.000 2.115 0 13.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 
BODINTERLOCKNo. COM.BUS 28.873 23.000 22.000 22.811 0 110.000 13.000 23.000 39.000 
CODE 0.433 0 0.000 0.496 0 1.000 0.000 0 1.000 
BODSIZE 6.484 6.000 63 1.799 3.000 13.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 
BODIND 5.382 5.000 4.000 1.716 2.000 12.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 
CEOINTERLOCK 0.327 0 0 0.470 0 1.000 0 0 1.000 
TOP20_SHR 0.807 0.668 0.380 2.513 0.164 42.200 0.477 0.668 0.839 
LOGSALES 5.194 5.279 0.000 0.971 0.000 7.442 4.669 5.279 5.780 
ROA -0.045 0.069 -30.880 1.874 -30.879 0.486 0.024 0.069 0.132 
ROS -0.211 0.102 -73.380 4.600 -73.375 3.300 0.041 0.102 0.244 
LOSS_DUMMY 0.142 0 0 0.350 0 1.000 0 0 0 
Profit before Tax 81239.720 17903.000 -1000.000 733474.500 -7199000.000 6297000.000 3260.000 17903.000 54985.000 
Panel B: Correlation Analysis  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Percentage of _BOD_INTLOCK 
(1) 1 
 
          
Log_COMP_INTLOCK (2) .637** 1           
BODSIZE (3) 0.049 .411** 1          
BODIND (4) .317** 0.107 -.243** 1 
 
       
CEOINTERLOCK (5) .247** .303** .185** -.272** 1        
TOP20_SHR (6) -0.073 0.055 -0.015 -0.049 -0.053 1 
 
     
CODE (7) -.121* -0.105 0.091 -0.115 0.048 0.062 1      
LOGSALES (8) .224** .392** .564** -0.063 .188** -0.063 -0.05 1     
ROA (9) -0.063 0.044 .178** 0.05 0.043 -0.004 0.05 .148* 1    
ROS (10) -0.057 0.052 .189** -0.052 0.042 0 0.037 .339** .202** 1   
LOG_TA (11) .262** .347** .521** .124* .140* -0.095 -0.098 .751** .190** .248** 1  
LOSS (12) -0.021 -.128* -.213** 0.025 0.072 -0.028 0.024 -.211** -.200** -.254** -.153* 1 
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; * significance at 10% level.
                                                          
3 Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
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Panel B of Table 2 reports the correlation analysis. Board interlocking directorship is 
positively correlated with independence of board and CEO interlocking (correlation coefficients 
are significant at better than 10 percent level, two tail tests), implying that interlocking firms 
have more independent directors and CEO while heavily involved in other boards. Considering 
shareholding by the top twenty shareholders (Top20SHR) factor results indicate a negatively 
correlation with the board interlocking, implying concentrated ownership firms have less 
independent directors and also less interlocking  during the observation period. Firms have less 
interlocking during the pre-code tenure. It seems that corporate governance codes have positively 
impacted development of interlocking among New Zealand listed companies. Following 
univariate analysis will provide more evidence for such relationship. Consistent with 
expectation, all the variables are significantly correlated with board interlocking. 
Table 3 presents a univariate test of difference in mean value for selected variables. 
During the pre-code period, board interlocking, company interlocking, percent of BOD 
independence are significantly different than post code period of Interlocking firms. Board 
interlocking, company interlocking, percent of board independence are significantly different for 
negative profit firms in compare with loss firm during the observation period. Finally, for firms 
with CEO interlock and non-CEO interlock firms, board interlock, company interlock, board size 
and percent of independent directorship are significantly different.  
 
Table 3 
Univariate Analysis 
Variables 
Code Loss Dummy CEO Interlock 
Pre-
code(a) 
Post-
code(b) 
mean 
difference 
+’ve 
profit 
-‘ve 
profit 
mean 
difference 
CEO 
interlock 
CEO not 
interlocked 
mean 
difference 
BOD interlock 0.831 0.777 2.01** 0.80 0.72 0.345* 0.886 0.769 -4.22*** 
Company 
interlock 1.356 1.274 1.74* 1.34 1.19 2.216*** 1.488 1.238 -5.23*** 
BODSIZE 0.785 0.808 -1.51 0.81 0.72 3.605*** 0.827 0.779 -3.12*** 
BODIND 0.853 0.819 1.91** 0.83 0.85 -0.420* 0.780 0.867 4.67*** 
CEOINTERL
OCK 0.31 0.35 -0.79 0.31 0.41 -1.191    
TOP20SHR 0.672 0.985 -1.03 0.83 0.64 0.465 0.617 0.910 0.88 
LOGSALES 5.23 5.13 0.81 5.27 6.25 3.51*** 5.465 5.072 -3.11*** 
ROA -0.127 0.623 -0.83 0.112 -0.965 3.37*** 0.071 -1.021 -0.71 
ROS -0.361 -0.017 -0.61 0.22 -3.35 4.25*** 0.771 -0.341 -0.68 
LOG_TA 5.54 5.36 1.64* 5.51 5.12 2.56** 5.631 5.372 -2.33* 
LOSS 0.13 0.15 -0.39    0.18 0.12 -1.91* CODE    0.43 0.46 -0.391 0.47 0.42 -0.79 
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; * significance at 10% level. 
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4.1 What determines board interlocking in New Zealand? 
Analysis of the multivariate results implies the following: although univariate analysis reveals 
some interesting insights, the results do not control for other known determinants of board 
interlocking choice. Table 4 examines the determinants of board interlocking and company-to-
company interlocking in New Zealand. Both the distress coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant at better than 1% level. Board size and percent of independent directors are positive 
and statistically significant which indicates that firms with large board size and more 
independent board have more interlocking directors. Alternatively, CODE (corporate governance 
code) is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. This result indicates that after 2003 
(post code period) directors are experiencing less interlocking in New Zealand. CEO interlock is 
positive and statistically significant with board and company-to-company interlocking, implying 
that firms have more interlocking directors and more company interlock when the CEO is also 
interlocked. However, the results of TOP20SHR are mixed. The positive coefficient with Log of 
Sales indicates that firms with more operating complexity have more interlocked directors. 
However, firm size proxy as Log of Total Assets shows mixed results with the board and 
company-to-company interlocking. 
Table 4 
Regression analysis: Interlocking equation 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 = 𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝜕6log (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7log (𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + ε … … … (1) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + ε … … … (2) 
 
 
 
Variables Predicated Signs Board Interlock (Coefficient) Company to Company interlock (Coefficient) 
Constant  0.26 -0.471*** 
BODSIZE + 0.48*** 1.08*** 
INDDIR + 0.59*** 0.751*** 
CODE ? -0.30*** -0.096** 
CEOINTERLOCK + 0.146** 0.268*** 
TOP20SHR -/+ -0.01 0.016** 
LOGSALES +/- 0.03 0.097** 
LOG_TA +/- 0.025 -0.047 
    
F-value  13.67*** 1.48*** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.251 0.329 
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; * significance at 10% level. 
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Where; Interlock board of director= total number of interlocking in the board with other firms board (board interlocking); 
Interlock company to company = total number of interlocking in the board with other firms (company to company 
interlocking); ROA = a proxy of firm performance, ratio of net income and total assets; ROS= a proxy of firm 
performance, ratio of total sales and total assets; LOSS_DUMMY= a proxy of firm performance, value of 1 if 
negative profit during the financial year, otherwise 0. Log (BODSIZE) = natural log of total number of directors in the 
board; %BODIND = percentage of total number of independent board members; CEO interlock =a dichotomous variable 
of CEO interlock measure. A value of ‘1’ is assigned if CEO is an interlocking member and ‘0’ otherwise; CODE= a 
dichotomous variable of 1 if observation is pre-corporate governance code, 0 otherwise; TOP20_SHROWN = total 
percentage of share hold by the top twenty shareholder; Log (SALES) = log value of sales, a proxy of firm operating 
complexity; Log (TA) = natural log of total assets as a proxy of firm size. 
 
Taken together with both the regression results, (1) & (2) provide evidence that boards 
are more interlocked when the board size is larger and with more independent directors. CEO 
interlocks also influence the interlocking directorship for firms in New Zealand. This result is 
consistent with Devos, Prevost and Puthenpurackal (2009) with the finding that shareholders 
react negatively to the formation of director interlocks and reduced sensitivity of CEO turnover 
to firm performance. 
 
4.2 Effects of interlocking in New Zealand firms 
Table 5 examines the firm performance when interlocking exists. All the three performance 
(ROA, ROS, LOSS Dummy) coefficients are negative with board interlocking and company-to-
company interlocking. Board interlocking is negative and statistically (at 1 to 10% level) 
significant for ROA, ROS and Loss Dummy. Company-to-company is negative and statistically 
significant (at 1 to 10% level except LOSS DUMMY) with ROA and ROS. 
Board size coefficient is positive and statistically significant (at 1 to 10% level) with 
ROA but negative significance with ROS and LOSSDUMY. Percent of independent director has 
positive coefficient with board interlocking and company-to-company interlocking for all the 
performance measure ROA, ROS and LOSS DUMMY. CEO interlock has negative coefficient 
with ROS for both interlocking measure with no significance but positive coefficient with ROA 
and LOSS dummy having no significance. Corporate governance code has positive coefficient 
with board and company-to-company interlocking for all three measures but mixed coefficient 
for TOP20SHR.  
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Table 5 
 Regression Analysis: Interlocking performance regression 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝜕6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + ε … … … (3) 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝜕6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + ε … … … (4) 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑 =  𝜕0 + 𝜕1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝜕2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝜕3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝜕4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 +
𝜕5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝜕6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝜕8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑜 𝑏𝑑𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + ε … … … (5) 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 +  𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 + ε … … … (6) 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 +
𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 + ε … … … (7) 
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐵𝐵𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐵𝑇20_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑑 +
𝛽5𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑑 + 𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽7 log(𝑇𝑆)𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑏 𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑐 + ε … … … (8) 
 
Variables Predicted sign 
Board interlocking Company to company interlock 
ROA ROS LOSS Dummy ROA ROS 
LOSS 
Dummy 
Constant  -4.09*** -8.85*** 0.46** -4.40 -9.34 0.472** 
Percentage of 
board interlocking ? -1.49*** -2.27*** -0.67*    
Company to 
company 
interlocking 
?    -0.416* -0.41* -0.21 
BODSIZE + 1.98* -1.80* -0.413** 2.57** -1.20* -0.41** 
INDDIR + 1.87** 1.04* 0.49 1.31* 0.06 0.26 
CEOINTERLOCK ? 0.24 -0.38 0.03 0.14 -0.265 0.25 
TOP20SHR + 0.08 0.31 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.03 
CODE -/+ 0.19 0.63 0.42 0.171 0.64 0.47 
LOGSALES +/- -0.03 2.44*** -0.10*** -0.36 2.48** -0.10** 
LOG_TA +/- 0.38*** -0.37 0.92** 0.327* -0.48 0.09** 
        
F-value  2.769*** 5.016*** 2.90*** 2.13** 4.69*** 2.95 
Adjusted R-Square  0.051 0.11 0.054 0.04 0.10 0.56 
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; * significance at 10% level. 
 
Where; Interlock board of director= total number of interlocking in the board with other firms board (board interlocking); 
Interlock company to company = total number of interlocking in the board with other firms (company to company 
interlocking); ROA = a proxy of firm performance, ratio of net income and total assets; ROS= a proxy of firm 
performance, ratio of total sales and total assets; LOSS_DUMMY= a proxy of firm performance, value of 1 if 
negative profit during the financial year, otherwise 0. Log (BODSIZE) = natural log of total number of directors in the 
board; %BODIND = percentage of total number of independent board members; CEO interlock =a dichotomous variable 
of CEO interlock measure. A value of ‘1’ is assigned if CEO is an interlocking member and ‘0’ otherwise; CODE= a 
dichotomous variable of 1 if observation is pre-corporate governance code, 0 otherwise; TOP20_SHROWN = total 
percentage of share hold by the top twenty shareholder; Log (SALES)= log value of sales, a proxy of firm operating 
complexity; Log (TA)= natural log of total assets as a proxy of firm size. 
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4. Conclusion and future research 
This study empirically identified and examined the determinant and consequences of board and 
company to company interlocking in the New Zealand business context. The study used both 
board and director levels of connectedness to measure the interlocking. As the managerial labour 
market has a shortage of independent and qualified directors in New Zealand, the effectiveness 
of corporate governance is questionable and suggests further investigation is warranted.  
Using a two-fold approach of firm interlocking such as board interlocking and company-
to-company interlocking, this research found evidence that New Zealand firms are significantly 
interlocked in both situations which causes negative performance of these firms as an immediate 
consequence. The interlock exhibited no effect on corporate governance best practice codes 
while a negative reaction was found for ownership concentrated firms. The study also flagged 
that interlocking behaviour affected by the CEO interlocking in New Zealand. However, this 
research will hopefully lead to further research on managerial discretion on earnings 
management. Due to the relaxed regulatory environment, interlocked director(s) could be 
members of audit committees that may lead to conflicts of interest; this is a unique situation that 
should receive future research. Monitoring effectiveness could be another avenue of research for 
the interlocking firms in New Zealand. 
This research has potential applicability to New Zealand regulatory agencies such as the 
Financial Market Authority (FMA) to evidence the close ties of top management to other firms. 
The New Zealand Institute of Directors could be another potential regulator who might benefit 
from the findings of this study to discourage CEO interlocking in New Zealand.  
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